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Abstract
In the aftermath of the global nancial crisis, there is consensus on the need for macroprudential
policies to promote nancial stability. However, the optimal way to implement such policies in the
Euro area is a question open to debate, given that countries have to coordinate. In this paper,
we propose a two-country, two-sector monetary union dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
(DSGE) with housing to analyze the optimal implementation of macroprudential policies in the Euro
area. Currently, Spain is the only country within the EU that has not established a macroprudential
regulator. We use Spain as a natural experiment to study the e¤ects of a lack of coordination in the
use of macroprudential policies in the European Monetary Union (EMU). We focus on a particular
macroprudential policy, a rule regarding the loan-to-value ratio, which responds countercyclically to
credit booms. We nd that such a policy is welfare enhancing for the Euro area. Nevertheless, if one
country does not implement the policy, but the rest of the EMU does, as in the current situation with
Spain, this country still yields some benets as a result of its partnersimplementation of the policy
because it gains from a more stable nancial system without incurring any output costs. However, if
all Euro countries actively implement the policy, the welfare gains for all of them are larger.
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"[...] The entry into force of the new EU prudential rules for banks on 1 January 2014 gives the
macro-prudential authorities in the EU a new set of policy instruments to address nancial stability
risks more e¤ectively. This will establish a common legal framework for macro-prudential policy across
the EU. However, the application of macro-prudential policy is still in its infancy. Much of the analytical
framework has yet to be developed.Mario Draghi, March 2014
1 Introduction
After the recent nancial crisis, a new set of economic policies was developed and referred to as macropru-
dential policies. The main objective of these policies is to prevent excessive credit growth and systemic
risk.1 Although there is consensus on the need for such policies, the best way to implement these policies
in a monetary union is still a question that is open to debate. The rst issue that arises is whether these
policies should be implemented centrally or at a national level. If they are set on a national basis, the
next question is how their implementation should be coordinated with other countries in the union that
are also implementing such policies. If there is no coordination, i.e., if one country does not apply the
same set of policies as the rest of the monetary union, this may have important implications for welfare,
nancial stability, and the functioning of the area.
When one country within a monetary union implements macroprudential policies, positive e¤ects
on nancial stability may spill over to other countries that are not implementing them. This could
lead to some accidental and unwanted consequences, including leakages and regulatory arbitrage, as well
as external e¤ects on other member states and an uneven playing eld. To alleviate these unintended
consequences, coordination and reciprocity are required between national macroprudential authorities.
In this context, coordination means that, within the monetary union, a member state applies to its own
institutions the same or an equivalent macroprudential measure to that set by another member state.
In the European Union (EU), the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is the main body respon-
sible for monitoring macroprudential policies, although each country can implement its own policy.2
That is, macroprudential policies are implemented at a national level, but within a system of central
supervision. Along these lines, the ESRB recommended in 2011 that Member States should designate a
national authority entrusted with the conduct of macroprudential policy.3 In the last Annual Report,
1See IMF (2011).
2The ESRB was established in 2010 as a component of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS). See
Section 3 for more details.
3See ESRB (2011).
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ESRB (2014a), the Board concluded that very di¤erent levels of accomplishment of the 2011 Recommen-
dation existed. In particular, it observed that 27 out of 28 EU members had already established their
national macroprudential competent supervisory authorities. The only country that remains without
a competent macroprudential supervisory authority, and that has not implemented a macroprudential
policy under the ESRB regulatory framework, is Spain. This represents an example of noncoordination
in these type of policies; therefore, the case of Spain provides a perfect natural experiment to study the
economic consequences of a lack of coordination in the implementation of a macroprudential instrument
in a currency area; i.e., it is an example of the case where one country does not apply a macroprudential
instrument that is being used by the rest of the area.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the implications of a lack of coordination in implementation of a
macroprudential instrument between one country within the currency area and the rest of the countries,
and to compare it with the consequences of coordination, when a country commences implementation
of the macroprudential instrument that has already been implemented by the rest of the currency area.
Therefore, this paper considers two situations: rst, the situation corresponding to the current state of
a¤airs, in which one country, Spain, has not implemented a macroprudential policy but the rest of the
Euro area has done so; and second, we forecast the situation where this country coordinates with the
rest of the union and puts in place a new macroprudential policy.
To achieve this goal, we propose a two-country, two-sector monetary union DSGE model4 with hous-
ing and collateral constraints, allowing for cross-country di¤erences in mortgage and housing markets.
In each country, there is a group of individuals that are credit constrained and need housing collateral
to obtain loans. Countries trade goods and savers in each country have access to foreign assets. In
our model, one of the countries is calibrated to represent the Spanish economy, our natural experiment,
whereas the other country in the model represents the rest of the Euro area. The model is appropriately
calibrated to reect the basic features of the Spanish economy, i.e., a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio that
is larger than average, variable rate mortgages, a GDP that is 10% of the Euro areas total GDP and
higher housing wealth as a proportion of GDP.
The basic modeling framework in this paper follows Rubio (2014), although we add macroprudential
measures. Our paper relates to di¤erent strands of the literature. The model constitutes a two-country,
two-sector version of the seminal paper of Iacoviello (2005), which introduces a nancial accelerator
4As Gerke et al. (2013) point out, this type of model is widely used by the national central banks of the European
System of Central Banks (ESCB). Although the di¤erent national banks capture country-specic characteristics and their
models di¤er in some respects, the models share some commonalities regarding their overall setup.
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that works through the housing sector, in line with Aspachs and Rabanal (2010). However, this paper
introduces cross-country housing market heterogeneity, as in Rubio (2014). In addition, this paper is
related to the recent literature on macroprudential and monetary policies in Iacoviello-type models,
including Kannan et al. (2012) and Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014). Finally, it is connected to
the literature on calibrated DSGE models for Spain, including Andrés et al. (2013), Ortega et al.
(2011), and Mora-Sanguinetti and Rubio (2014). However, none of these models consider the study of
macroprudential policies in Spain in relation to the rest of the Euro area.
In this paper, we evaluate an LTV rule as the relevant macroprudential instrument, considering
the comments of the ESRB, which believes that this instrument is suitable for avoiding credit booms
in real estate markets, which create substantial risks to nancial stability.5 In particular, we analyze
the implementation of a rule for the LTV ratio, where the rule is analogous to how monetary policy is
conducted. We assume that, in the same way that the central bank follows a Taylor rule for monetary
policy, the macroprudential authority follows a linear rule in carrying out macroprudential policy, using
the LTV ratio as an instrument. The monetary policy literature has shown that simple rules result in
good performance. Therefore, it seems sensible to apply this kind of rule to macroprudential supervision
(see Yellen, 2010).6 We consider a rule for the LTV ratio that means it responds to deviations of credit
from the steady state. In this way, booms that lead to an increase in borrowing are moderated.7 To
reect the recommendations of the ESRB, we consider that the macroprudential rule is implemented at
a national level.
Using this modeling framework, we shed some light on the e¤ects of a lack of coordination in the use
of macroprudential policies in the Euro area, taking the case of Spain as an example. That is, taking
monetary policy as given, we calculate the optimal implementation of the macroprudential rule in the
rest of the Euro area, when macroprudential policies are not active in Spain. This case represents the
current situation in the Euro area. Then, we look at the counterfactual of coordination, when Spain
also implements macroprudential policies, and we compute the optimal macroprudential rule for both
5ESRB (2014) considers that this macroprudential instrument can be implemented by national authorities targeting
borrowers to increase the resilience of both banks and borrowers.
6We can nd other examples of LTV ratio rules in the literature. Funke and Paetz (2012) use a nonlinear rule for the
LTV ratio and nd that it can help reduce the transmission of house price cycles to the real economy. In a similar way,
Kannan et al. (2012) examine a monetary policy rule that reacts to prices, output, and changes in collateral values with a
macroprudential instrument based on the LTV ratio. Lambertini et al. (2013) allow for the implementation of both interest
rate and LTV ratio policies in a model with news shocks.
7The IMF (2013) states that a macroeconomic environment that gives rise to credit growth will contribute to the build-up
of systemic risk.
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regions. This represents a future case.8 We calculate the welfare associated with each case for each agent
in the economy, for each country, and for the whole union. In addition, we show how the dynamics of
the economy under expansionary shocks are di¤erent in each situation.
Our results show that macroprudential policies are welfare enhancing for the Euro area because
they promote nancial stability. However, the welfare gain is larger if all countries in the monetary
union implement the policies, i.e., if there is coordination. We nd that if Spain does not implement
macroprudential policies, but the rest of the union does, as in the current situation, then Spain benets
slightly from its partnerspolicies because it can enjoy a more stable nancial system without incurring
any output costs. However, if both regions, Spain and the rest of the union, have active macroprudential
policies, then the welfare gains are larger. In terms of the dynamics, we present impulse responses to
di¤erent shocks that generate a credit boom in the economy: a productivity shock, a housing demand
shock, and an expansionary monetary policy shock. We nd that, given the expansionary nature of these
shocks, credit increases. However, when the country has an active macroprudential rule in place, the
LTV ratio declines and the credit boom is mitigated.
These results have important implications in terms of policy. If the ESRB wants to increase nancial
stability in the whole monetary union and maximize the unions welfare, it should lead union members
towards a coordinated implementation of macroprudential policies.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we provide a DSGE setting for studying macropru-
dential policy implementation in a country within a monetary union, in interaction with its partners.
Then, within this setting, we are able to answer a specic research question: what are the consequences
of the lack of coordination of one of the countries (namely Spain) and, conversely, the implications of
potential coordination? These are the novel and worthwhile contributions of our paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the current institutions in charge
of the implementation of macroprudential policy in the EU. Section 3 describes the model. In Section
4, we determine the optimal macroprudential policy and the associated dynamics. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
8 It is expected that Spain will eventually put in place a macroprudential authority.
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2 Macroprudential Policy in the EU
The ESRB is responsible for the macroprudential oversight of the EUs nancial system and contributes
to the prevention or mitigation of systemic risks to nancial stability arising from developments within the
nancial system.9 It should contribute to the smooth functioning of the internal market and, thereby,
ensure that the nancial sector plays a role in fostering sustainable economic growth.10 All types
of nancial intermediaries, markets, and infrastructures in the 28 EU countries may be systemically
important to some degree and may be an object of analysis for the ESRB.11
As stated in the Introduction, the ESRB recommends that EU Member States should designate a
national macroprudential authority to be in charge of nancial stability policies.12 To date, 27 of the
28 EU members have already appointed macroprudential authorities. All these countries have followed
one of three models for establishing the authorities in charge of the implementation of macroprudential
policies at the national level. Nine countries have given power to authorities that are separate from
the central bank to implement their macroprudential policies;13 another 15 countries have delegated the
implementation of macroprudential policies to their central banks;14 and three countries have decided
to share the responsibility for macroprudential policy implementation between the central bank and
another institution.15 However, the only country that remains without a competent macroprudential
9See EU (2010a).
10EU (2010) denes systemic risk as a risk of disruption in the nancial system with the potential for serious negative
consequences for the internal market and the real economy.
11The ESRB was established in 2010 as a component of the ESFS, along with the European Supervisory Authorities
(ESAs), comprising the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA),
and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). The ESFS also includes the Joint Committee
of the ESAs and the competent supervisory authorities in micro- and macroprudential policies of the member states.
12See ESRB (2011) Recommendation ESRB/2011/3 of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the
macro-prudential mandate of national authorities (OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p. 1)
13These nine countries and their macroprudential authorities are as follows: Austria: Finanzmarktstabilitätsgremium
(Financial Market Stability Board); Denmark: Erhvervs-og Vaekstminister (Minister of Business and Growth) and Fi-
nanstilsynet (the Supervisory Diamond for banks); Finland: Finanssivalvonta (Financial Supervisory Authority); France:
Autorité de Controle Prudentiel et de Résolution (Prudential Supervisory Authority); Germany: Bundesanstalt für Finanz-
dienstleistingsaufsicht (Federal Financial Supervisory Authority) and Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität (Financial Stability
Committee); Luxembourg: Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (Financial Sector Supervisory Commission);
Malta: Malta Financial Services Authority; Poland: Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego (Polish Financial Supervision Author-
ity); and Sweden: Finansinspektionen (Financial Supervision).
14These 15 countries and their central banks are: Belgium: Banque Nationale de Belgique/Nationale Bank van België
(The Belgian Central Bank); Bulgaria: Bulgarian National Bank; Croatia: Hrvatska Narodna Banka (Croatian National
Bank); Cyprus: Central Bank of Cyprus; Czech Republic: µCeská národní banka (Czech National Bank); Estonia: Eesti
Pank (Bank of Estonia); Greece: Bank of Greece; Hungary: Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Hungarian National Bank); Ireland:
Banc Ceannais na hÉireann (Central Bank of Ireland); Italy: Banca dItalia (Bank of Italy); Lithuania: Lietuvos Bankas
(Bank of Lithuania); Portugal: Banco de Portugal (Bank of Portugal); Romania: Banca Nat¸ional¼a a României (National
Bank of Romania); Slovakia: Národná banka Slovenska (National Bank of Slovakia); and Slovenia: Banka Slovenije (Bank
of Slovenia).
15These three countries and their relevant institutions are: Latvia: Finanu un kapita¯la tirgus komisijas (Financial and
Capital Market Commission) and Latvijas Banka (Bank of Latvia); Netherlands: De Nederlandsche Bank (The Dutch
Bank) and the Rijksoverheid (Dutch government); and the UK: the Financial Conduct Authority and the Bank of England.
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supervisory authority is Spain.16
Spain recently su¤ered a huge bust in its real estate sector, which provoked an enormous downturn
in the real and nancial sectors.17 The recent crisis in Spain was centered in the housing sector. Easier
borrowing conditions, together with speculative housing demand, gave rise to a housing bubble that
burst, causing a strong recession. Spains accession to the Euro area resulted in unprecedentedly low
interest rates, which were low partly because of the good economic performance of Spains Euro partners.
Furthermore, most Spanish mortgage loans were subscribed at variable rates, referenced to the 12-month
Euribor rate, which is strongly linked to the overnight rate of the European Central Bank (ECB). Such
loans accounted for 91% of the Spanish market at the end of 2009, according to the ECB (2009).
Mortgages set at xed rates are available on the market, but are less popular as a result of restrictions
on prepayment fees, leading to higher nominal interest rates and borrower preferences.18 All this,
together with strong housing demand, brought about a house price and credit boom in Spain that was
the seed of the crisis.19 This boom was one of the engines for Spains economic growth before the bust.20
Nevertheless, once the bust commenced, the crisis hit Spain more severely than it did other developed
economies because of Spains excessive dependence on the real estate industry.21
When determining an appropriate macroprudential instrument, authorities faced serious implemen-
tation challenges, including dening their intermediate objectives and the source of the systemic risk they
wanted to confront, determining the legal requirements for accomplishment, and ensuring ease of com-
munication for policy implementation. If the intermediate objective is to mitigate and prevent excessive
sectoral credit growth and leverage in the real estate market, the LTV ratio was determined to be a good
option compared with other instruments that could mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and
leverage in general, including a countercyclical capital bu¤er, an increased own funds requirements, or
16Note that, in case of need, the Bank of Spain would act as the macroprudential authority.
17 In Spain, bank branches distribute most mortgage loans (direct channel) compared with real estate developers or real
estate agencies (indirect channel). Since the crisis, their participation in the market has increased signicantly to cover
nearly all of the mortgage market.
18See European Mortgage Federation (2012) for more information on the Spanish housing sector.
19 In Spain, house prices more than doubled in the decade from 1997 to 2007, whereas in Germany, house prices fell by
more than 10% after 2003. See Moro and Nuño (2012).
20See Akin et al. (2014).
21The Management Company for Assets Arising from the Banking Sector Reorganization (Sociedad de Gestión de Activos
Procedentes de la Reestructuración Bancaria), known as SAREB, was created in November 2012 to clean up the Spanish
institutions that were experiencing issues as a result of excessive exposure to the real estate sector. The Memorandum
of Understanding (MoU), signed by the Spanish government, with its European partners, in July 2012, determined the
constitution of SAREB as a condition for Spain receiving nancial aid. Two hundred thousand real estate assets, valued at
50.781 billion euros, were transferred to SAREB. Of these assets, 80% were loans and 20% were properties. The majority,
55%, of SAREBs share capital is private, with the remaining 45% owned by the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring
(FOBR), or the Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria (FROB), the public entity created to manage the banking
sectors restructuring process.
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a leverage ratio. In the case of an unsustainable demand-driven real estate boom, selecting instruments
that primarily target bank borrowers (such as LTV ratio limits), is likely to be more e¤ective and less
costly than bank-oriented measures (such as higher capital requirements on mortgages with minimum
risk weights or loss given default oors). The legal requirements are another important consideration
in selecting the appropriate macroprudential instrument. Whereas some instruments are implemented
under national laws, others depend on European laws, with legal requirements for some measures being
more demanding than for others. The LTV ratio limit depends on national laws and is by far easier to
implement than, e.g., the global systemically important institutions bu¤er, which depends on European
legislation and requires notication to the European Commission, the ESRB, and the EBA. Finally, in
selecting instruments, macroprudential authorities should favor instruments for which the purpose and
design can be easily communicated and explained. The communication policy is an important and inte-
gral part of the macroprudential implementation. The LTV ratio limit was determined to be an easier
policy to communicate, even to more general audiences, than other policies. For the preceding reasons,
the LTV ratio limit appears to be an interesting and worthwhile macroprudential policy measure to
study, especially in a model calibrated for Spain, which has signicant issues in its real estate sector, as
discussed above.22
Before the crisis, some measures were introduced by the Bank of Spain to alleviate the credit boom.
In particular, Spain introduced dynamic provisioning, which was unrelated to specic bank loan losses,
in 2000, with subsequent modications to the formula parameters made in 2005 and 2008. It has
been found that provisioning has only a small impact on credit growth, whereas it is useful in building
up countercyclical bu¤ers to strengthen the solvency of banks.23 Although these measures seemed
to be e¤ective as preventive tools, in this case, they were not su¢ cient for Spain to avoid the crisis.
BBVA (2012) points out that the Spanish dynamic provisioning was criticized on several grounds. First,
international accounting bodies argued that it implied prot smoothing along the cycle and masked
the real situation of the banks. Second, Spanish nancial institutions complained about being subject
to higher provisioning requirements than their competitors and, therefore, being put at a disadvantage
in the single European market for nancial services. The IMF (2011) nds that the instrument was
22For a deeper analysis, see ESRB (2015).
23Saurina (2009) argues that there was no guarantee, given the depth of the Spanish crisis at that time, that the amounts
provisioned would be enough to cover the loan losses that banks were facing. Nevertheless, Saurina (2009) considers that
dynamic provisions contributed to the stability of the Spanish nancial system and allowed Spanish banks to deal with the
crisis from a much better starting point. Similarly, Jiménez et al. (2012) nd that countercyclical dynamic provisioning
smoothed the cycle in the supply of credit and, in bad times, upheld rm nancing and performance.
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e¤ective in helping to cover rising credit losses during the crisis, but that the coverage was incomplete
because of the severity of the actual losses. Furthermore, even though Spain was a pioneer in the use of
macroprudential policies before the crisis, it is taking longer than the rest of the Euro area to implement
them after the crisis.
Given the experience of the Spanish economy with dynamic provisioning, it seems sensible to examine
alternative measures to enhance nancial stability, including the LTV ratio rule. ESRB (2014b) consid-
ers that LTV ratio policies are e¤ective in managing the credit cycle and improving banksresilience.
Furthermore, from an empirical point of view, Cerutti et al. (2016) nd that LTV ratio policies are
especially e¤ective in reducing systemic risk and they are more useful in the boom phases of the cycle
than in the bust ones. Therefore, we consider that focusing on the LTV ratio in our paper is an appro-
priate means of studying the implications of the lack of coordination in implementing a macroprudential
instrument.
3 Model Setup
We consider an innite-horizon, two-country, two-sector economy inside a monetary union. The home
country (Spain) is denoted by SP in the model equations and the other country, encompassing the
rest of the union, is denoted by EUR. Households consume, work, and demand real estate. There is a
nancial intermediary in each country that provides mortgages and accepts deposits from consumers.
Each country produces one di¤erentiated intermediate good, but households consume goods from both
countries. For simplicity, housing is a nontraded good and we assume that labor is immobile across the
countries. Firms face a standard Calvo problem. In this economy, both nal and intermediate goods are
produced. Prices are sticky in the intermediate goods sector. A construction sector produces houses.
Monetary policy is conducted by a single central bank that responds to a weighted average of ination
in both countries. There is a rule for the LTV ratio, which serves as a macroprudential measure. We
allow for housing-market heterogeneity across the countries, so that we can pick up the specic features
of each country.
3.1 The Consumers Problem
There are three types of consumers in each country: unconstrained consumers, constrained consumers
who borrow at a variable rate, and constrained consumers who borrow at a xed rate. The proportion of
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each type of borrower is xed and exogenous.24 Consumers can be constrained or unconstrained in the
sense that constrained individuals need to collateralize their debt repayments in order to borrow from the
nancial intermediary, whereas unconstrained consumers do not. Interest payments in the next period
cannot exceed a proportion of the future value of the current housing stock. In this way, the nancial
intermediary ensures that borrowers will be able to fulll their debt obligations in the next period. As in
Iacoviello (2005), we assume that constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones.25
There is a nancial intermediary in each country. The nancial intermediary in SP accepts deposits
from domestic savers and it extends both xed- and variable-rate loans to domestic borrowers.
3.1.1 Unconstrained Consumers (Savers)
Unconstrained consumers in SP maximize as follows:
max E0
1X
t=0
t

lnCut + jt lnH
u
t  
(Lut )



; (1)
Here, E0 is the expectation operator,  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, and Cut , Hut and Lut are con-
sumption at t, the housing stock and hours worked, respectively.26 jt represents the weight of housing
in the utility function. We assume that log (jt) = log(jSP ) + uJt, where uJt follows an autoregressive
process, where jSP is the steady-state value of the weight of housing. A shock to jt represents a shock
to the marginal utility of housing. These shocks directly a¤ect housing demand and, therefore, can be
interpreted as a proxy for exogenous disturbances to house prices or, in other words, as a house price
shock. 1= (   1) is the aggregate labor-supply elasticity.
Consumption consists of a bundle of domestically and foreign-produced goods, dened as: Cut =
(CuSPt)
n (CuEURt)
1 n ; where n is the size of SP. Unconstrained consumers provide labor to both the
consumption and the construction sectors, so that Lut =
h
(Luct)
1  + (Luht)
1 
i 1
1 
:
The budget constraint for SP is as follows:
24We follow Rubio (2011) in leaving this proportion xed and exogenous. According to the European Mortgage Federation,
the di¤erent types of mortgage contracts o¤ered across countries are largely a response to institutional or cultural factors,
which are out of the scope of the present model. In the short run, the proportion of each type of mortgage contract can
uctuate, but typically it does not imply a change in the xed- or variable-rate proportion at the country level.
25This assumption ensures that the borrowing constraint is binding in the steady state and that the economy is endoge-
nously split into borrowers and savers.
26 It is assumed that housing services are proportional to the housing stock.
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D2t  QSPtHut 1+
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u
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u
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u
t +Dt + PSPtFt + PSPtSt; (2)
where PSPt and PEURt are the prices of the goods produced in countries SP and EUR, respectively,
QSPt is the housing price in SP, and W uct and W
u
ht are the consumption and housing sector wages for
unconstrained consumers. But represents domestic bonds denominated in the common currency. RSPt
is the nominal interest rate in SP. Positive bond holdings signify borrowing and negative bond holdings
signify savings. However, as we will see, this group will choose not to borrow at all: they are the savers
in this economy. Dt are foreign-bond holdings by savers in SP.27 Rt is the nominal rate of foreign bonds,
which are denominated in euros. As is common in the literature, to ensure stationarity of net foreign
assets, we introduce a small quadratic cost of deviating from zero foreign borrowing,  2D
2
t .
28 Savers
obtain interest on their savings. St and Ft are lump-sum prots received from the rms and the nancial
intermediary in SP, respectively.
Dividing by PSPt, we can rewrite the budget constraint in terms of goods in SP:
CuSPt+
PEURt
PSPt
CuEURt+qSPtH
u
t +
RSPt 1but 1
SPt
+
Rt 1dt 1
PSPt
+
 
2
d2t  qSPtHut 1+wuctLuct+wuhtLuht+but +dt+Ft+St;
(3)
where SPt denotes ination for the goods produced in SP, dened as PSPt=PSPt 1:qSPt is the house
price in SP, dened in terms of the price of goods in SP.
Maximizing (1) subject to (3) ; we obtain the rst-order conditions for the unconstrained group:
CuSPt
CuEURt
=
nPEURt
(1  n)PSPt ; (4)
1
CuSPt
= Et

RSPt
SPt+1CuSPt+1

; (5)
27Savers have access to international nancial markets.
28See Iacoviello and Smets (2006) for a similar specication of the budget constraint.
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Et

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SPt+1CuSPt+1

; (6)
wuct = (L
u
t )
 1 (Luct)
 
h
(Luct)
1  + (Luht)
1 
i 
1  CuSPt
n
; (7)
wuht = (L
u
t )
 1 (Luht)
 
h
(Luct)
1  + (Luht)
1 
i 
1  CuSPt
n
; (8)
jt
Hut
=
n
CuSPt
qSPt   Et n
CuSPt+1
qSPt+1: (9)
Equation (4) equates the marginal rate of substitution between goods to the relative price. Equation (5)
is the Euler equation for consumption. Equation (6) is the rst-order condition for net foreign assets.
Equations (7) and (8) are the labor-supply conditions for both sectors. These equations are standard.
Equation (9) is the Euler equation for housing, which states that, at the margin, the benets from
consuming housing have to be equal to the costs.
Combining (5) and (6), we obtain a nonarbitrage condition between home and foreign bonds:29
RSPt =
Rt
(1   dt) : (10)
As all consumption goods are traded and there are no barriers to trade, we assume, in this paper,
that the law of one price holds:
PSPt = P

SPt; (11)
where variables with a star denote foreign variables.
3.1.2 Constrained Consumers (Borrowers)
There are two types of constrained consumers in SP: those who borrow at a variable rate and those who
do so at a xed rate. The di¤erence between the two groups is the interest rate they are charged. The
variable-rate constrained consumer faces RSPt, which will coincide with the rate set by the central bank.
29The log-linearized version of this equation could be interpreted as the uncovered interest-rate parity.
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The xed-rate borrower pays RSPt, derived from the nancial intermediarys problem. The proportion
of variable-rate consumers in SP is constant and exogenous and is equal to SP 2 [0; 1].
Constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones, i.e., e < . Constrained con-
sumers face a collateral constraint: the expected debt repayment in the next period cannot exceed a
proportion of tomorrows expected value of todays housing stock:
Et
RSPt
SPt+1
bcvt  kSPtEtqSPt+1Hcvt ; (12)
Et
RSPt
SPt+1
bcft  kSPtEtqSPt+1Hcft ; (13)
where equations (12) and (13) represent the collateral constraint for the variable- and xed-rate borrow-
ers, respectively. kSPt can be interpreted as the LTV ratio in SP. Note that in models with collateral
constraints, the LTV ratio is typically considered to be exogenous. At the macroeconomic level, LTV
ratios depend partly on exogenous factors, including regulation. This parameter is usually calibrated to
match the average LTV ratio in the country analyzed. However, in this model, it can vary, depending
on economic conditions, because it is utilized as a macroprudential policy variable. As we will see, when
we introduce the problem of the nancial intermediary, RSPt is an aggregate interest rate that contains
information on all the past xed-interest rates associated with past debt. In each period, this aggregate
interest rate is updated with a new interest rate, linked to the new amount of debt originating in that
period.
Without loss of generality, we present the problem only for the variable-rate borrower because the
problem for the xed-rate borrower is symmetrical. Variable-rate borrowers maximize their lifetime
utility function as follows:
max E0
1X
t=0
etlnCcvt + jt lnHcvt   (Lcvt )

; (14)
where Ccvt = (C
cv
SPt)
n (CcvEURt)
1 n ; Lcvt =
h
(Lcvct )
1  + (Lcvht)
1 
i 1
1 
; subject to the budget constraint
(in terms of goods in SP):
CcvSPt +
PEURt
PSPt
CcvEURt + qSPtH
cv
t +
RSPt 1bcvt 1
SPt
 qSPtHcvt 1 + wcvctLcvct + wcvhtLcvct + bcvt ; (15)
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and subject to the collateral constraint (12). Note that variable-rate borrowers repay all debt every
period and acquire new debt at the current new interest rate. This assumption implies that the interest
rate on variable-rate mortgages is revised every period for the whole debt stock and changed according
to the policy rate.30 To make the problem for xed-rate borrowers symmetrical and analogous to
existing models with borrowing constraints, we assume the same debt-repayment structure for this type
of borrower. Obviously, xed-rate contracts are not revised every period. However, to make the model
more realistic, but still tractable, the xed-interest rate will be such that a revised xed rate will be
applied only on new debt, keeping the interest rate applied to existing debt constant. In this way, we
reconcile the structure of the model with the fact that xed-rate contracts are long term.31
The rst-order conditions for the consumers are as follows:
CcvSPt
CcvEURt
=
nPEURt
(1  n)PSPt (16)
n
CcvSPt
= eEt nRSPt
SPt+1CcvSPt+1

+ cvt RSPt; (17)
wcvct = (L
cv
t )
 1 (Lcvct )
 
h
(Lcvct )
1  + (Lcvht)
1 
i 
1  CcvSPt
n
; (18)
wcvht = (L
cv
t )
 1 (Lcvht)
 
h
(Lcvct )
1  + (Lcvht)
1 
i 
1  CcvSPt
n
; (19)
jt
Hcvt
=
n
CcvSPt
qSPt   eEt n
CcvSPt+1
qSPt+1   cvt kSPtEtqSPt+1SPt+1: (20)
These rst-order conditions di¤er from those for the unconstrained individuals. In the case of con-
strained consumers, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint (cvt ) appears in equations
(17) and (20). As in Iacoviello (2005), the borrowing constraint is always binding, so that constrained
individuals borrow the maximum amount that they are allowed to borrow and their saving is zero.32
30This assumption is consistent with reality as variable interest rates are revised very frequently and change according to
an interest-rate index that is tied to the interest rate set by the central bank.
31Another option would be to have an overlapping generations model in which we are able to keep track of the debt issued
each period. However, the model would become more complex and less comparable with the standard collateral constraint
DSGE models, such as that of Iacoviello (2005).
32From the Euler equations for consumption for the unconstrained consumers, we know that RSP = 1=, where variables
without a time subscript denote steady-state variables. If we combine this result with the Euler equation for consumption
for the constrained individual, we have cv = n

   e =CcvSP > 0. Given that  > e, the borrowing constraint holds with
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The problem for consumers in EUR is analogous to that for consumers in SP.
3.2 The Financial Intermediary
We assume a competitive framework and, thus, the intermediary takes the variable interest rate as
given.33 The prots of the nancial intermediary are dened as follows:34
Ft = SPRSPt 1bcvt 1 + (1  SP )RSPt 1bcft 1  RSPt 1but 1; (21)
where Ft are the prots of the nancial intermediary. RSPt and RSPt are the variable and the xed
rate, respectively.
In equilibrium, aggregate borrowing and saving must be equal, i.e.:
SP b
cv
t + (1  SP ) bcft = but : (22)
Substituting (22) into (21), we obtain:
Ft = (1  SP ) bcft 1
 
RSPt 1  RSPt 1

: (23)
For the two types of mortgage to be o¤ered, the xed-interest rate has to be such that the intermediary
is indi¤erent between lending at a variable or xed rate. Hence, the expected discounted prots that the
intermediary obtains by lending new debt in a given period at a xed-interest rate must be equal to the
expected discounted prots that the intermediary would obtain by lending at a variable rate:
E
1X
i=+1
i ;iRSP
OPT
 = E
1X
i=+1
i ;iRSPt 1; (24)
where t;i =
CuSPt
CuSPt+i
is the relevant discount factor for the unconstrained consumer. As the nancial
intermediary is owned by the savers, their stochastic discount factor is applied to the nancial interme-
diarys problem. Note that, as stated previously, the variable-rate debt applies to one period, but the
portion of new debt acquired at a xed rate is associated with a long-term contract. As the agent is
equality in the steady state. As the model is log-linearized around the steady state and low uncertainty is assumed, this
result can be generalized to o¤-steady-state dynamics.
33See Andrés et al. (2013) for a housing model with collateral constraints in which banks are imperfectly competitive
and are able to set optimal lending rates.
34The superscript cv signies constrained variableand cf signies constrained xed.
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innitely lived, we assume here that the maturity of xed-rate mortgages is also innity. We can obtain
the equilibrium value of the xed rate in period  from expression (24) :
R
OPT
SP =
E
1P
i=+1
i ;iRSPt 1
E
1P
i=+1
i ;i
: (25)
Equation (25) states that, for every new debt issued at date  , there is a di¤erent xed-interest rate
that has to be equal to a discounted average of future variable-interest rates. Note that this is not a
condition on the debt stock, but on the new amount of debt obtained in a given period. New debt at a
given point in time is associated with a di¤erent xed-interest rate than that applied to the debt stock.
Both the xed-interest rate in period  and the new amount of debt in period  are xed for all future
periods. However, the xed-interest rate varies depending on the date that the debt was issued so that,
in every period, there is a new xed-interest rate associated with new debt in this period. If we consider
xed-rate loans to be long term, the nancial intermediary obtains interest payments every period from
the whole debt stock , not only from the new debt. Hence, we can dene an aggregate xed-interest rate
as the one that the nancial intermediary e¤ectively charges every period for the whole mortgages stock.
This aggregate xed-interest rate is composed of all past xed-interest rates and past debt, together with
the current-period equilibrium xed-interest rate and the new amount of debt. Therefore, the e¤ective
xed-interest rate that the nancial intermediary charges for the xed-rate debt stock every period is as
follows:
RSPt =
8><>:
RSPt 1b
cf
t 1+R
OPT
SPt

bcft  bcft 1

bcft
if bcft > b
cf
t 1
RSPt 1 if b
cf
t  bcft 1
9>=>; : (26)
Equation (26) states that the xed-interest rate that the nancial intermediary charges today is an
average of what it charged in the previous period for the previous mortgages stock and what it charges
in the current period for the new amount. If there is no new debt, the xed-interest rate will be equal
to that of the previous period. Then, in the same way that variable rates are revised every period, xed
rates are revised by including the new optimal xed-interest rate for the new debt originating in this
period. Importantly, this assumption is not crucial for our results. Both R
OPT
SP and RSPt are practically
una¤ected by interest rate shocks.35 This assumption is a way to make the model compatible with the
35 In log-linearized terms, the new xed interest rate is always equal to the past xed interest rate and, therefore, equation
(26) does not introduce a kink.
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fact that xed-rate loans are not one-period assets but longer-term ones.
As noted above, any prots from nancial intermediation are rebated to the unconstrained consumers
every period. The nancial intermediary is competitive and does not make prots in the absence of shocks
but, should a shock occur, the fact that only the variable-interest rate is directly a¤ected can generate
nonzero prots.36
The nancial intermediary problem for EUR is symmetrical.
3.3 Firms
3.3.1 Final-Consumption Goods Producers
In SP, there is a continuum of nal-goods producers that aggregate intermediate goods according to the
production function:
Y kSPt =
Z 1
0
Y kSPt (z)
" 1
" dz
 "
" 1
; (27)
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods.
The total demand for intermediate good z is given by YSPt (z) =

PSP (z)
PSPt
 "
YSPt; and the price
index is PSPt =
hR 1
0 PSPt (z)
1 " dz
i 1
" 1
:
3.3.2 Intermediate Goods and House Producers
The intermediate-goods consumption market is monopolistically competitive. Following Iacoviello (2005),
intermediate goods are produced according to the following production function:
YSPt (z) = t (L
u
ct (z))
 (Lcct (z))
(1 ) ; (28)
where t represents technology. We assume that log t =  log t 1 + ut, where  is the autoregressive
coe¢ cient and ut is a normally distributed shock to technology.  2 [0; 1] measures the relative size
of each group in terms of labor. Lct is labor supplied by constrained consumers, dened as SPL
cv
t +
(1  SP )Lcft .
Symmetry across rms allows us to avoid index z and to rewrite equation (28) as:
YSPt = t (L
u
ct)
 (Lcct)
(1 ) : (29)
36This modeling of the xed interest rate follows Rubio (2011) and Rubio (2014).
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The production function for housing investment is as follows:
ISPt = t (L
u
ht)
 (Lcht)
(1 ) : (30)
Producers maximize prots as follows:
max
Lct;Lht
YSPt
Xt
+ qtISPt   wuctLuct   wuhtLuht   wcvctLcvct   wcvhtLcvt   wcfct Lcfct   wcfhtLcft : (31)
The rst-order conditions for labor demand are as follows:
wuct =
1
Xt

YSPt
Luct
; (32)
wcvct = w
cf
ct =
1
Xt
(1  ) YSPt
Lcct
; (33)
wuht = 
qtISPt
Luht
; (34)
wcvht = w
cf
ht = (1  )
qtISPt
Lcht
; (35)
where Xt is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost. The price-setting problem for the intermediate-
goods producers is a standard CalvoYun case. An intermediate-goods producer sells goods at price
PSPt (z) and 1   is the probability of being able to change the sale price in every period. The optimal
reset price POPTSPt (z) solves the following:
1X
k=0
()k Et

t;k

POPTSPt (z)
PSPt+k
  "= ("  1)
Xt+k

Y OPTSPt+k (z)

= 0: (36)
The aggregate price level is given as follows:
PSPt =
h
P 1 "SPt 1 + (1  )
 
POPTSPt
1 "i1=(1 ")
: (37)
Using (36) and (37) and log-linearizing, we can obtain the standard forward-looking Phillips curve.37
The rm problem is similar for EUR.
37This Phillips curve is consistent with other two-country models with nancial accelerators. See, e.g., Gilchrist et al.
(2002) or Iacoviello and Smets (2006).
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3.4 Aggregate Variables and Market Clearing
Given SP ; the fraction of variable-rate borrowers in SP, we can dene aggregates across constrained
consumers as the sum of variable-rate and xed-rate aggregates, so that Cct  SPCcvt + (1  SP )Ccft ;
Hct  SPHcvt + (1  SP )Hcft and bct  SP bcvt + (1  SP ) bcft :
Therefore, economy-wide aggregates in country SP are Ct  Cut + Cct , Lt  Lut + Lct . Domestic
housing market clearing requires that ISPt 
 
Hut  Hut 1

+
 
Hct  Hct 1

:
The market-clearing condition for the nal good in country SP is nYSPt = nCSPt + (1  n)CSPt +
n 2 d
2
t . Domestic nancial markets clear as follows: b
c
t = b
u
t : The world bond market-clearing condition
is ndt + (1  n) PEURtPSPt dt = 0; where dt denotes the foreign bonds in real terms. The net foreign asset
position follows dt =
Rt 1
(1  dt)SPtdt 1 + YSPt   CSPt  
PEURt
PSPt
CEURt. Everything is similar in EUR.
3.5 Monetary Policy
The model is closed, with a Taylor rule and interest-rate smoothing, with interest rates set by a single
central bank,38
Rt = (Rt 1)
h
(SPt)
n (EURt)
(1 n)
i(1+)
R
1 
"R;t; (38)
0    1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia. (1 + ) measures the sensitivity of
interest rates to current ination. "R;t is a white noise shock process, with zero mean and variance 2" .
This rule is consistent with the primary objective of the ECB being price stability.
3.6 Macroprudential Policy
As an approximation for a realistic macroprudential policy, we consider a Taylor-type rule for the LTV
ratio. In standard models, the LTV ratio is a xed parameter that is not a¤ected by economic condi-
tions. However, using regulations on LTV ratios can be considered as a way to moderate credit booms.
When the LTV ratio is high, the collateral constraint is looser and borrowers will borrow as much as
they are allowed to, given that the constraint is binding when tight. Lowering the LTV ratio tight-
ens the constraint and restricts the loans that borrowers can obtain. As a result of recent research on
macroprudential policies, Taylor-type rules for the LTV ratio have been proposed, which would ensure
38This type of rule is used in other monetary union models. See Iacoviello and Smets (2006) and Aspachs and Rabanal
(2011). Furthermore, as shown in Iacoviello (2005) and Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2013), a rule that only responds to
ination enhances the nancial accelerator.
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that the ratio reacts inversely to variables including GDP growth rates, credit, the credit-to-GDP ratio
and house prices. These rules are a simple illustration of how a macroprudential policy could work in
practice. Here, we assume that there exists a macroprudential Taylor-type rule for the LTV ratio that
ensures that the ratio responds to deviations of credit from the steady state. In this way, we consider the
macroprudential regulators objective of moderating economic booms, which could lead to an excessive
growth of credit. We consider a decentralized policy rule, so that each country can implement its own
rule at a national level, responding to its own credit variables, as follows:
kSPt = kSS_SP

bSPt
bSP
 bSP
; (39)
kEURt = kSS_EUR

bEURt
bEUR
 bEUR
; (40)
where kSS_SP and kSS_EUR are the steady-state values for the LTV ratio in SP and the rest of the
Euro area, respectively. bSP  0 and bEUR  0 measure the response of the LTV ratio to deviations of
credit from its steady state in SP and the rest of the Euro area, respectively.
3.7 Parameter Values
Parameters are calibrated to reect the economy of Spain and the economy of the rest of the Euro area.
Some of the parameters are standard and common to both economies, whereas others are specically
calibrated for each economy. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix present a summary of the parameter
values.
Discount factors are set to be common in both economies, following the standard values in the
literature. The discount factor for savers, , is set to 0:99 so that the annual interest rate is 4% in the
steady state. The discount factor for borrowers, e, is set to 0:98.39 The steady-state weight of housing in
the utility function, j, is set to 0:12 and 0:143 for the Euro area and Spain, respectively. This parameter
reects the di¤erences between Spain and the Euro area in terms of the ratio of housing wealth to GDP.40
We set  = 2, implying that the labor supply elasticity has a value of 1:41 Following Horvath (2000) and
39Lawrence (1991) estimated discount factors for poor consumers at between 0:95 and 0:98 at quarterly frequency.
40Following Aspachs and Rabanal (2008), we consider 1.40, which is the ratio of housing wealth to GDP across most
industrialized countries, to be a proxy for the Euro area. This delivers a parameter value of 0.12 for the steady-state weight
of housing in the utility function. For Spain, we use the parameter calibrated in Ortega et al. (2011).
41Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in a range from zero to 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén (2006)
show that, in the presence of borrowing constraints, this estimate could have a downward bias of 50%.
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Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we set the inverse elasticity of substitution across hours in the two sectors
to one. For the LTV ratio, we use steady-state values of 0:79 and 0:725 for the Euro area and Spain,
respectively, based on the LTV ratio observed in the data.42 The labor-income share of unconstrained
consumers, , is set to 0:7.43 We pick a value of 6 for ", the elasticity of substitution among intermediate
goods. This value implies a steady-state markup of 1:2. The probability of not changing prices, , is set
to 0:75, implying that prices change every four quarters on average. For the Taylor-rule parameters, we
use  = 0:8 and  = 0:5: The rst value reects a realistic degree of interest-rate smoothing.44  is
consistent with the original parameters proposed by Taylor in 1993. We consider , the proportion of
variable-rate mortgages, to be 0:43 and 0:91 in the Euro area and Spain, respectively. 45 The size of
Spain is considered to be 10% of the size of the Euro area.46 A technology shock involves 1% positive
technology with 0.9 persistence.47 Housing demand shocks have a 0.95 persistence.48 We set the size
of the shock to the housing-demand parameter at 24.89%, consistent with Iacoviello (2005). Monetary
policy shocks are represented by a 0.29% increase in the interest rate on a quarterly basis, as in Iacoviello
(2005).
4 Optimal Macroprudential Policy
In this section, we determine the optimal macroprudential policy that maximizes country welfare. We
consider two cases: one that corresponds to the current situation, where Spain is not implementing
macroprudential policies yet but the rest of the Euro area is; and a second case in which Spain implements
macroprudential policies along with the rest of the Euro area.
The following subsection describes our welfare measure.
42This value corresponds to the typical LTV ratio for a rst-time house buyer. See ECB (2009), Table 2.
43This value is within the range of estimates provided by Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) for the US, and
those of Campbell and Mankiw (1991) for the US, Canada, France, and Sweden. Therefore, we consider it to be valid for
most countries in the Euro area.
44See McCallum (2001).
45The data are from ECB (2009), Housing Finance in the Euro area (Table 2). Loans with variable interest rates are
loans extended at oating rates or with an initial period of xed rates of up to one year. If the xed interest rate period is
longer than one year, the housing loan is considered to be a xed rate loan.
46We follow Andrés et al. (2013) in choosing this value.
47This high persistence value for technology shocks is consistent with what is commonly reported in the literature. Smets
and Wouters (2003) estimate a value of 0.822 for this parameter in Europe and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) estimate a value
of 0.93 for the US.
48The persistence of the housing demand shock is consistent with the estimates in Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
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4.1 Welfare Measure
To provide a welfare measure, we numerically evaluate how cross-country asymmetries a¤ect welfare for
a given policy rule and for technology shocks. As discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2012), the two
approaches that have recently been used for welfare analysis in DSGE models are either to characterize
the optimal Ramsey policy, or to solve the model using a second-order approximation of the structural
equations for the given policy and to then evaluate welfare using this solution. As in Mendicino and
Pescatori (2007), we take the latter approach so that we can evaluate the welfare of the two types of
agents separately.49 The individual welfare for savers and borrowers, respectively, in SP is dened as
follows:
Vu;t  Et
1X
m=0
m
 
lnCut+m + jt lnH
u
t+m  
 
Lut+m


!
; (41)
Vcv;t  Et
1X
m=0
em lnCcvt+m + jt lnHcvt+m    Lcvt+m
!
; (42)
Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we dene social welfare in SP as a weighted sum of the
individual welfare for the di¤erent types of households:
Vt = (1  )Vu;t +

1  e [AVcv;t + (1  A)Vcf;t] : (43)
The welfare of borrowers and savers is weighted by

1  e and (1  ) ; respectively, so that the two
groups receive the same level of utility from a constant consumption stream. For EUR, everything is
symmetrical to SP.
Total welfare is dened as a weighted sum of the welfare in the two countries:
Wt = nVt + (1  n)V t : (44)
4.2 Optimal Parameters
Table 1 presents the optimized parameters for the macroprudential rules, in particular for those described
in equations (39) and (40). We take monetary policy as given and determine the parameters that
49We use Dynare software to obtain a solution for the equilibrium implied by a given policy by solving a second-order
approximation of the constraints. We then evaluate welfare under the policy using this approximate solution, as in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004). See Monacelli (2006) for an example of the Ramsey approach in a model with heterogeneous
consumers.
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maximize welfare for the two cases mentioned above, i.e.:
1. Spain does not implement macroprudential policies but the rest of the Euro area (EUR) does, i.e.,
the no-coordination case.
2. Spain implements macroprudential policies as well as the Euro area (SP and EUR), i.e., the
coordination case.
Table 1: Optimal Macroprudential Policy
EUR SP and EUR
bSP   0:99
bEUR 1:9 1:9
The rst column of Table 1 corresponds to the case in which Spain is not implementing macropru-
dential policies but the rest of the union is and, thus, the countries are not coordinated in their policies.
In this column, we nd the optimal parameter for the reaction of the LTV ratio to deviations of credit
from its steady state only for the rest of the Euro area. In the second column, we nd the optimal
parameter for both Spain and the rest of the union. We see that the optimal policy for Spain is less
aggressive than that for the rest of the Euro area. The reason for this relates to the mortgage interest
rate that each region faces. In Spain, mortgage rates are variable and monetary policy is more e¤ective.
In the rest of the Euro area, mortgage rates are xed and the macroprudential policy needs to be more
aggressive to compensate for the less-e¤ective monetary policy.
Table 2: Welfare Gain
EUR SP and EUR
SP 0:04 0:59
Borrowers 0:17 1:53
Savers  0:11  0:36
EUR 9:44 9:92
Borrowers 31:5 33:14
Savers  0:67  0:68
Union 7:29 8:01
Then, in Table 2, using the optimal parameters described above, we present the welfare gains (in
consumption equivalents) resulting from implementing this optimal rule. As in Ascari and Ropele (2012),
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we nd the constant fraction of steady-state consumption that would have to be transferred to the agent
if a welfare loss occurred under the new parameterization.50 Here, a positive value for consumption units
represents a welfare increase; i.e., it indicates how much the agent would pay in units of consumption
to be better o¤. A negative value means that welfare has decreased, i.e., it indicates by how much an
agent should be compensated in units of consumption for the welfare loss. As a benchmark, we take the
case in which there are no macroprudential policies in place.
We can observe from Table 2 that macroprudential policies are welfare enhancing.51 Even if only the
rest of the Euro area has an LTV ratio rule, and Spain does not coordinate (the rst column of Table
2), this is welfare improving for the whole union, including Spain. However, the gain is even larger if
Spain also implements the policies, i.e., if there is coordination (the second column of Table 2).
In models with collateral constraints, macroprudential policies deliver welfare gains because of the
negative distortion arising from the constraint. That is, in these kinds of models, the collateral constraint
is always binding and, therefore, borrowers are not able to smooth consumption as savers do. Thus,
a policy that enhances nancial stability results in a more stable scenario for borrowers, with a more
stable consumption path and helps reducing the negative e¤ects of the constraint. However, as is usual
for this kind of model, a trade-o¤ occurs between borrowers and savers. Savers are worse o¤ with
macroprudential policies because the macroprudential policy goals may conict with monetary policy
goals, namely price stability. Note that, in this model, the sticky-price assumption creates a distortion
that a¤ects savers. As the savers are the owners of the rms, ideally they would prefer a world in which
there is price stability, which is the goal of monetary policy. If monetary policy loses e¤ectiveness when
macroprudential policies are introduced, savers may not like the latter policies. In the aggregate, the
economy benets from macroprudential policies but the gain comes from the borrowersside.
50The consumption equivalent measure for the saver, as in Ascari and Ropele (2009), is given by 1  exp[(1 )(Vu;new 
Vu;old], and analogously for the other agents.
51Note that these values may seem larger than those found for standard models. However, we have to consider the fact
that the collateral constraint makes borrowerswelfare very sensitive to changes in macroprudential policies. Furthermore,
we are not optimizing monetary policy and, therefore, introducing an optimal policy delivers large welfare gains.
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Table 3: Volatilities
No Macropru EUR SP and EUR
SP
y 2.0107 1.9745 1.9784
 0.2228 0.2351 0.2389
b 3.2977 3.2423 0.9123
EUR
y 2.0076 1.9897 1.9876
 0.2158 0.2333 0.2341
b 3.6893 0.6331 0.6324
Union
y 2.0077 1.9881 1.9866
 0.2165 0.2334 0.2346
b 3.5342 0.8492 0.6381
Table 3 displays both macroeconomic and nancial volatilities to help us understand where the
welfare gains come from. We calculate the standard deviations for output, ination, and borrowing for
Spain, the rest of the Euro area, and the whole union (SP and EUR). Our benchmark is the case in
which there are no macroprudential policies in place (rst column). Then, we see how these volatilities
change when we consider the optimized parameters obtained in Table 1 (shown in the second and third
columns of Table 3). We can observe that, when the macroprudential policy is introduced in the rest
of the Euro area but not in Spain, Spain nevertheless benets from a more stable economy, in terms
of both output and borrowing. This comes at the expense of greater volatility in terms of ination
because of the conicts that arise between macroprudential and monetary policies, in the context of
supply-side shocks.52 However, if Spain also implements macroprudential policies, nancial stability in
Spain improves substantially and, therefore, the stability of the whole union is enhanced.53
Thus, when the rest of the Euro area only (not Spain) activates the LTV ratio rule, this region gains
in terms of welfare because the new policy delivers greater nancial stability, which benets borrowers.
Even though it does not implement the macroprudential measure, Spain also benets from its Euro
52See Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015) for a detailed explanation of the policy conicts.
53Creel et al. (2015) nd that nancial instability has a negative impact on economic performance in the EU. They
obtain this result by examining di¤erent measures of nancial instability.
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partnerspolicy because of the more stable nancial scenario created. Furthermore, macroprudential
policies usually entail an output cost as they reduce borrowing and the demand coming from constrained
individuals is restricted.54 Thus, Spain experiences a double gain as it benets from a more stable
nancial system overall, without compromising its output.55
Then, when we move to the situation in which both regions are implementing macroprudential
policies, we see that the gains are larger for the whole union, as well as for each region independently.
Now, with Spain contributing to nancial stability, borrowers from both regions can benet. Welfare
in the rest of the Euro area increases marginally in this case because the whole union enjoys greater
nancial stability. This case of coordination between Spain and the rest of the Euro area means welfare
in the whole union increases by more than it does in the case where there is no coordination.
4.3 Impulse Responses
In this subsection, we present the dynamics of the model with the optimized parameters found in
Table 1, as well as those for the benchmark case. That is, we compute impulse responses for three
expansionary shocks that generate a credit boom: a productivity shock, a housing demand shock and an
expansionary monetary policy shock. These shocks would produce a credit boom in the economy that
macroprudential policies can reduce through the activation of the LTV ratio rule. We compare the case
in which macroprudential policies are not in place (the benchmark case) with the cases where, rst, the
optimal macroprudential rule is implemented only in the rest of the Euro area, and second, where it is
implemented in the whole area, including Spain.
Figure 1 presents the impulse responses to a technology shock. This is an expansionary shock that
makes output increase in a more e¢ cient way, reducing ination. The expansion that the shock generates
in the economy makes borrowing increase, activating the macroprudential rule in the cases in which it
is in place. We observe that, for the benchmark case, where there are no macroprudential policies, the
LTV ratio stays at its steady state and borrowing increases both in Spain and the rest of the Euro
area. However, with macroprudential policies in place, when the credit increase occurs, the LTV ratio
decreases to avoid excessive credit growth, which is the aim of the macroprudential regulator. We see
that the LTV ratio is cut in Spain only in the case in which macroprudential policies are implemented in
54Note that this macroprudential policy involves only a short-term output cost because the policy does not represent a
change in the steady state. Welfare benets are long term.
55According to the DSGE model simulations presented by Cuerpo et al. (2015), an adjustment in the housing sector of the
Spanish economy could have a signicant negative impact on economic activity through a decrease in housing investment
and consumption.
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock. Optimized parameters for Macroprudential Policies
the whole Euro area, including Spain. In the rest of the Euro area, the LTV ratio decreases regardless
of whether Spain implements the policy or not. For the cases in which the macroprudential rule is
active and the LTV ratio goes down, we see that credit does not increase as much as it does without
the macroprudential rule. Consumption increases in all cases, given the expansionary nature of the
shock, but it increases slightly less when the macroprudential policy is in place, representing the output
cost that macroprudential policies have, i.e., the fact that they mitigate shocks. When Spain does not
implement the LTV ratio rule, but the rest of the Euro area does, Spain benets from the higher nancial
stability that the macroprudential policy implies, but it does not experience the output cost, as can be
seen from the slightly stronger response of consumption in Spain. The interest rate, which is common
to the whole region, decreases because the productivity shock makes ination fall. The decrease in the
interest rate represents an extra expansionary e¤ect, coming from the demand side.
Figure 2 displays impulse responses to a housing demand shock for both Spain and the rest of the
Euro area. A housing demand shock is directly translated into a house price increase and it could also
be interpreted as a house price shock. As borrowers use housing as collateral, the increase in house
prices makes their collateral more valuable. In turn, this makes their borrowing increase, resulting in an
expansionary e¤ect on the economy. However, given the di¤erences in the housing preference parameter
for both regions, the expansionary e¤ects are stronger in Spain than in the rest of the Euro area. As
in the previous case, when the macroprudential policy is active, the LTV ratio decreases, mitigating the
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a Housing Demand Shock. Optimized Parameters for Macroprudential
Policies
credit increase. When Spain is not implementing the macroprudential policy, the LTV ratio remains at
its steady state and borrowing increases as much as in the benchmark case. Nevertheless, consumption
increases slightly more than in the benchmark case, which reects the fact that there is no output cost
in Spain arising from active macroprudential policies, in contrast to the situation in the rest of the Euro
area. However, with the macroprudential policy in place for Spain, the output cost becomes evident and
consumption increases just marginally for Spain. In the case of the rest of the Euro area, the reduction
in the LTV ratio means that borrowing does not increase from the steady state and, thus, there is little
reaction to the shock in terms of consumption.
Finally, Figure 3 represents the e¤ects of an expansionary monetary policy shock, i.e., a one standard
deviation decrease in the interest rate. Again, this is an expansionary shock that would deliver a credit
boom, as in the previous cases. Now, the easiness in credit conditions makes borrowing increase, given
that debt repayments will be lower. However, as in the other cases, macroprudential policies make the
LTV ratio decrease to avoid an excess in credit growth. As we can observe, when macroprudential
policies are in place, the LTV ratio falls, reacting to the credit growth increase. As a consequence, the
increase in borrowing is less pronounced when the macroprudential policies are active. The response of
output is also slightly mitigated when the macroprudential rule is implemented.
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to an Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock. Optimized Parameters for
Macroprudential Policies
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we explore the implementation of macroprudential policies in the Euro area. Considering
that such policies are decided at the national level, we are interested in determining the consequences
of a lack of coordination among di¤erent countries. We analyze the e¤ects on welfare and nancial
stability of the fact that one of the countries is not implementing the macroprudential policy (the no-
coordination case). Then, we see what happens to the economy when all countries implement the policy
(the coordination case).
For this purpose, we build a two-country DSGE model, with housing and collateral constraints to ex-
plore the optimal implementation of macroprudential policies in the Euro area. The model distinguishes
between the consumption and housing sectors, unconstrained consumers (savers) and constrained con-
sumers (borrowers) and variable and xed interest rates for borrowers. Monetary policy is operated by
the ECB at a centralized level, whereas macroprudential policies, using the LTV ratio as an instrument,
are implemented at a national level, as the ESRB recommends.
In particular, we analyze the lack of coordination in macroprudential policies in the Euro area,
taking the case of Spain as a natural experiment. Spain is the only country within the EMU that has
not commenced the implementation of macroprudential policies and, therefore, it provides a perfect
example of our no- coordination case. Therefore, in our model, we calibrate one of the countries to
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represent the Spanish economy, whereas the other country represents the rest of the Euro area.
We nd that macroprudential policies, introduced as a countercyclical LTV ratio rule, which responds
to credit deviations from the steady state, are welfare enhancing for the monetary union. Welfare gains
mainly come from the borrowers side because this measure promotes nancial stability. Savers are
worse o¤ because there is a conict between monetary and macroprudential policy goals. However, total
welfare gains are larger when the whole area implements the policy, i.e., when there is coordination
across members. When Spain does not apply such macroprudential policies, it still benets marginally
from a more stable nancial system, without incurring any output cost. Nevertheless, gains increase
when all countries activate the policy.
In terms of dynamics, our results show that when macroprudential policies are active, credit booms
generated from expansionary shocks are mitigated. The LTV ratio decreases in those cases and makes
borrowing increments lower.
The policy implications of these results are clear: macroprudential policy coordination should be
promoted to maximize welfare in the whole monetary union and increase nancial stability in all areas.
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Appendix
Additional Tables and Figures
Table A1: Country-Specic Parameter Values
EUR SP
j 0:12 0:143 Weight of Housing in Utility Function
k 0:79 0:725 Average LTV
 0:43 0:91 Degree of variability of interest rate
n 0:90 0:10 Country size
Table A2: Common Parameter Values
 :99 Discount Factor for Saverse :98 Discount Factor for Savers
 2 Parameter associated with labor elasticity
 :70 Labor-Income share for savers
" 6 Elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods
1   2 Labor elasticity of substitution across sectors
 0:8 Interest-rate smoothing in Taylor rule
 :5 Ination Parameter in Taylor rule
 0:29 Monetary shock standard error
 0:9 Technology shock persistence
j 0:95 Housing Demand shock persistence
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